Budgets play a significant role in real-world sequential auction markets such as those implemented by Internet companies. To maximize the value provided to auction participants, spending is smoothed across auctions so budgets are used for the best opportunities. This paper considers a smoothing procedure that relies on pacing multipliers: for each bidder, the platform applies a factor between 0 and 1 that uniformly scales the bids across all auctions. Looking at this process as a game between all bidders, we introduce the notion of pacing equilibrium, and prove that they are always guaranteed to exist. We demonstrate through examples that a market can have multiple pacing equilibria with large variations in several natural objectives. We go on to show that computing either a social-welfare-maximizing or a revenue-maximizing pacing equilibrium is NP-hard. Finally, we develop a mixed-integer program whose feasible solutions coincide with pacing equilibria, and show that it can be used to find equilibria that optimize several interesting objectives. Using our mixed-integer program, we perform numerical simulations on synthetic auction markets that provide evidence that, in spite of the possibility of equilibrium multiplicity, it occurs very rarely across several families of random instances. We also show that solutions from the mixed-integer program can be used to improve the outcomes achieved in a more realistic adaptive pacing setting.
Introduction
In the last decade, auction markets have become a pervasive mechanism used by Internet companies to match bidders to their target audience at the right price. Bidders typically specify a targeting rule, a valuation for an event such as impression, click, conversion or video view, and an overall budget for the period of interest. The mechanism put in place by the auction market selects users matching the targeting rule, and allows bidders to bid for the selected event. This results in a winner who is given the chance to show the impression and potentially generate the event of interest. It is a responsibility of the mechanism to guarantee that the total payments of bidders does not exceed the budgets they specified.
The simplest way to take budgets into account is to subtract payments from the budget every time an event is generated. This is repeated until the bidder runs out of budget. At that time, the bidder effectively stops participating in the auctions. Unfortunately, this simple procedure is clearly not optimal: if the auctioneer is able to anticipate that the budget will run out well before the Figure 1 : Relation between bids and total value for a budget of $10 time period is over, it makes sense to bid less aggressively at earlier stages to be able to participate in later auctions. These later auctions, after all, may have some of the best opportunities for the bidder since they may be cheaper. Figure 1 shows an example in which a bidder has a $5 value for winning and a $10 budget. Here, a Vickrey (second-price) auction is used for each auction. (Assume that all bids are per impression.) As shown on the left, for that value, the bidder is able to possibly win any one of the auctions, but can only win the first 6 auctions since afterwards budget runs out. In that case, the total value is 6 × $5 = $30 at a cost of $10. Instead, as shown on the right, the bidder can win more auctions with a bid of $2. The bidder wins 7 auctions for a total value of 7 × $5 = $35 at a cost of $10.
The previous situation motivates that auction market mechanisms more actively take budgets into account. One possibility is to toss an appropriately weighted coin for each auction that determines whether a bid is actually placed into the auction on the bidder's behalf. If the appropriate probability is selected, the bidder's budget will run out just around the end of the bidding period. Doing this for all bidders results in the process being more stable over time-as opposed to having many bidders early on and then auctions becoming thinner as bidders run out of budget, as shown on the left side of the figure. Still, this approach also has its drawbacks. Bidders will not be considered in some auctions purely because of a coin toss, and the missed opportunities may be the ones where the bidder could have won at lower cost.
Another solution for the mechanism is to shade bids on the bidders' behalf. (Again, for simplicity, consider a bidder who is bidding on a per-impression basis; appropriate modifications can be made for a bidder bidding on a per-click basis.) When it appears that simply bidding the valuation v i will result in the budget being spent before the period is over, the mechanism can simply shade down each bid to α i v i , where α i ∈ [0, 1] is referred to as a pacing multiplier. An optimal multiplier will make the budget run out exactly at the end of the period, unless the bidder would not run out of budget even with α i = 1.
The multiplicative pacing approach can be given a Lagrangian interpretation as follows. The optimality of a pacing multiplier α i < 1 implies that the bidder's budget has been set too low. As a result, the dollars in the budget are special dollars that represent a scarce resource, which are worth more than regular dollars. Once these special dollars are valued appropriately in view of the budget constraint, bidding truthfully becomes optimal again, but only if bids are expressed in special dollars. Because a regular dollar is worth a fraction of a special dollar, the valuations expressed in special dollars are a fraction of the valuations expressed in regular dollars, and this fraction matches exactly the pacing multiplier α i .
Each bidder is affected by the other bidders' multipliers. For instance, considering two bidders i and j, if bidder i's multiplier α i goes down, this may result in bidder j winning more impressions, so α j needs to go down too. Or, alternatively, it may result in bidder j having to pay less for the impressions she is winning, so that α j can go up. Because the effect can work in both directions, and bidder i is similarly affected by α j , it is not obvious that there must exist a vector of multipliers for all bidders that is mutually optimal.
Hence, as compared to probabilistic pacing, multiplicative pacing allows a bidder to participate in more auctions and win at lower prices. This motivates us to consider multiplicative pacing in this paper. 1 In addition, conclude that multiplicative pacing is optimal out of various options.
The main question we address in this paper is whether there is a vector of multipliers that are simultaneously optimal for all bidders in a single-slot auction market. In other words, all multipliers are set in such a way that every bidder either spends the entire budget, or has a multiplier of 1. The choice of the vector of pacing multipliers can be viewed as a game in which each multiplier is a best response to all the other multipliers. Hence the vector of optimal pacing multipliers can be viewed as the equilibrium of such a game. Although it is the platform that computes the multipliers on the bidders' behalf in practice, this can still be viewed as a game since, otherwise, bidders can change valuations if budgets are spent too fast.
We first prove that an equilibrium always exists (which does not follow immediately from existing results due to discontinuities in the case of ties). Then, we show that these equilibria can be sensitive to budgets. We also show that a pacing game can admit multiple equilibria that are not outcome equivalent, which leads to equilibrium selection issues. We compute equilibria with respect to commonly-studied objective functions such as social welfare and revenue to provide insights on the gaps between best and worst equilibria. Then, we study the complexity of finding an equilibrium, and we provide a mixed-integer programming (MIP) approach to find it, which we evaluate experimentally. Finally, we evaluate best-response and regret-based dynamics as alternative computational tools for finding equilibria.
Since there are many unknowns in real-world auction markets (e.g., auction participants, user visits, resulting prices, event realizations, etc.), practical mechanisms learn the optimal multipliers along the way by adjusting them up or down depending on the forecasts of when the budget will run out. In our theoretical model, we sidestep the issue of dynamically adjusting the multipliers, and consider the limit case in which the auctioneer can perfectly predict the impressions that will arrive. Because we assume away the stochastic and dynamic elements, and we focus on per-impression bids, we present our results abstractly in terms of bidders that bid on a collection of items with a budget.
That being said, our theoretical results do have a number of implications for real-world auction markets in which the pacing multipliers are determined by a dynamic adjustment process (see the appendix for a brief discussion). First, one may wonder whether, under such dynamic adjustment, the multipliers will necessarily eventually equilibrate (assuming that the stochastic process according to which impressions arrive is stationary). While we do not address this question directly, we do provide a first step towards an answer by showing that at least, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Second, even if multipliers will eventually converge to an equilibrium, one may wonder about the properties of that equilibrium. We show that there are examples of the game that admit intrinsically-distinct equilibria. That is, natural objectives such as paced welfare (welfare appropriately adjusted with the pacing multipliers) and revenue may be different. We show that finding an 1 There are some reasons one may prefer probabilistic pacing over multiplicative pacing. For example, with multiplicative pacing, if a bidder doubles her budget, it will result in higher bids being entered on her behalf, and hence she may win a qualitatively different set of auctions. Hence, her return may not double, which is perhaps counterintuitive. On the other hand, under probabilistic pacing, the bids entered on her behalf would still be the same; they are just entered more often. Hence it is more likely that she just wins twice as many auctions of the same types she won before-at least if she is a small enough bidder so doubling her budget does not significantly affect other bidders' probabilities of entering auctions.
equilibrium that optimizes those objectives is NP-hard, so that we cannot expect simple dynamics to be guaranteed to reach such equilibria in polynomial time. On the positive side, our experimental results provide evidence that multiplicity of equilibria is rare and outcomes are not very different when multiplicity exists, at least among the family of random instances we consider.
In our experiments we do also investigate an adaptive pacing setting, and show that the regretbased adaptive pacing algorithm of Balseiro and Gur (2017) finds an allocation that is close to the solution of our MIP. We also find that the outcome in the adaptive setting can be improved by seeding the adaptive dynamics with our MIP solution, even when the MIP solves a noisy instantiation of the adaptive setting.
Our results create many opportunities for future research: In spite of the possibility of convergence to different equilibria, are there settings where we "usually" converge to an optimal or at least a good equilibrium? Can one find dynamics that are more likely to reach a given equilibrium to improve equilibrium selection? And can one formally show that certain settings or topologies "usually" avoid multiplicity of equilibria?
2 Related work Mehta et al. (2007) introduced the AdWords problem, which casts the budget smoothing problem as an online matching problem. The authors introduce a 1 − 1/e approximation algorithm for revenue maximization in this setting, under the reasonable assumption that bids are small relative to budgets. However, this line of work does not consider fixed allocation and pricing mechanisms, and focuses instead on matching bidders directly to goods without running an auction. The AdWord problem was later extended to the problem of matching a slate of bidders to each good. In this setting, an auction can then be run on the chosen slate. Abrams et al. (2007) consider this approach and investigate a linear programming approach based on column generation. The AdWords model and slate allocation have been further generalized to broader resource allocation models and various other assumptions about the setting (Feldman et al., 2010; Devanur et al., 2011; Bhalgat et al., 2012) . Charles et al. (2013) introduce a solution concept that allows a game-theoretic analysis of this type of slate-matching mechanism. They prove that under their concept solutions are guaranteed to exist, and provide polynomial-time algorithms (exact for the single-slot setting and heuristic for the multiple-slot setting). In contrast to this line of work, we are interested in a setting where we cannot exclude bidders from the auctions, and thus have to use pacing methods in order to satisfy budgets. Charles et al. (2013) also introduce desiderata for a good budget-smoothing policy: high welfare, no large short-term revenue loss, and even smoothing. Mahdian et al. (2012) initiated the study of online ad matching with stochastic arrivals (as opposed to worst case). Goel and Mehta (2008) and Devanur and Hayes (2009) study a random permutation setting. The stochastic model was further studied by Feldman et al. (2009 Feldman et al. ( , 2010 ; Devanur et al. (2011 Devanur et al. ( , 2012 and Mirrokni et al. (2012) . Vee et al. (2010) study stochastic arrivals where arrivals are sampled from a known underlying bipartite graph. As with Mehta et al. (2007) , these articles consider only matching, rather than auctions, and are thus not applicable to our setting.
Another line of research considers how individual bidders should optimize their budget spending across a set of auctions. In the theory literature this has often been cast as a form of knapsack problem Feldman et al. (2007) ; Borgs et al. (2007) ; Chakrabarty et al. (2008) . Amin et al. (2012) and Gummadi et al. (2013) consider a Markov Decision Process formulation of the budget optimization problem. Zhang et al. (2012 Zhang et al. ( , 2014 and Xu et al. (2015) cast varying budget allocation and bid pricing problems as constrained optimization or optimal control problems. Agarwal et al. (2014) describe a practical implementation of an adaptive probabilistic pacing method, and present experiments on data from advertising at LinkedIn.
The closest paper to this one is a groundbreaking paper by , which was done independently. They define equilibria for a variety of budget management procedures, including multiplicative pacing, and prove existence. This is related to our existence result later on, although they assume continuous distributions and as a result effectively assume away ties, so that an equilibrium can be defined purely in terms of budget management parameters (multipliers). In contrast, we do need to worry about how ties are broken, specifically how much of each item goes to each tied bidder, and these fractions are a fundamental part of what constitutes an equilibrium in our setting. (It is interesting to note that various concepts of market equilibrium also require that items are carefully split between bidders. As such, our concept has aspects of game-theoretic equilibria as well as market equilibria.) Ties in the bids are not a measure-zero event in our setting, because pacing parameters will often result in ties even for generic valuations. Hence, we must be more careful to prove equilibrium existence than in models where ties are assumed away. compare how well different budget management procedures perform on various objectives in symmetric settings; we have no analogous result, since we focus on multiplicative pacing only. We do provide some examples showing that equilibria can be very sensitive to budgets and that multiple equilibria of the same game can be different from each other in terms of natural objectives. introduce an iterative algorithm based on the bidders repeatedly best-responding that is not always guaranteed to converge to equilibrium and evaluate it in experiments. We show that in our setting such an algorithm can cycle, give an exact mixed integer program formulation for finding optimal equilibria (also showing that these problems are NP-hard), and evaluate it in experiments. Balseiro et al. (2015) investigate budget-management in auctions through a fluid mean-field approximation, which leads to elegant existence results and closed-form descriptions of equilibria in certain settings. Similarly to , they differ from our setting in that they effectively assume away ties by making distributional assumptions on the payments faced by the bidders. Balseiro et al. (2015) and both differ from our work in another crucial aspect: in their distributional settings, they assume that for a given impression, the valuation of each bidder is independent from that of other bidders. In contrast to this, our work requires no such assumption.
Finally, a number of authors have taken a mechanism design approach. Rather than trying to adapt variants of second-price auctions through budget smoothing, they design entirely new mechanisms that handle budgets by design (Ashlagi et al., 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2010; Dobzinski et al., 2012; Goel et al., 2015b,a) . This line of work has resulted in many interesting theoretical developments. However, for practical purposes we here focus on methods that implement second-price auctions, as these tend to be preferred in real-world auction markets.
Pacing Games for Auction Markets
We consider a single-slot auction market in which a set of bidders N = {1, . . . , n} target a set of goods M = {1, . . . , m}. Each bidder i has a budget B i > 0 and valuation v ij ≥ 0 for each good j. We assume that the goods are sold through independent second-price auctions, and the valuations and budgets are assumed to be known to the auctioneer. Bidders receive a utility equal to the valuation of the goods for the auctions they win, net of the payments resulting from those auctions. If their payments exceed their budgets, they are assumed to receive a −∞ utility. To fix ideas, The goal is to compute a vector of pacing multipliers that smooths out the spending of each bidder such that they stay within budget. A pacing multiplier for a bidder i is a number α i ∈ [0, 1] that is used to scale down the valuations of the bidder across all auctions. For each good j, bidder i participates in the auction for good j with a bid of α i v ij ; we refer to these bids as multiplicatively paced. We call an instance of the above auction market a pacing game.
The following proposition shows that relying on multiplicative pacing is in the best interest of bidders.
Proposition 1. Suppose we allow arbitrary bids in each auction, i.e., the bids b ij are not necessarily multiplicatively paced. Then, holding the bids of all other bidders in all auctions fixed, each bidder i has a best response that is multiplicatively paced (assuming that, when she is tied to win an item, she can choose the fraction of the item she wins).
Proof. Consider a best response by bidder i consisting of bids b i1 , . . . , b im . Let α max i = max j b ij /v ij , and without loss of generality suppose α max i is minimized among best responses for bidder i. We will show that bidding b ij = α max i v ij is also a best response. Suppose not. Clearly α max i ≤ 1 since it never helps to bid more than one's valuation. Hence b ij ≤ v ij for all j. Because we have b ij ≥ b ij for all j, i can only be winning more items, at prices below her valuations. Hence the only way in which the b ij can fail to be a better response than the b ij is by exceeding i's budget. Because by assumption i can break ties as she wishes, it follows that with the b i she exceeds her budget even if she accepts none of the items for which she is tied. Because the b ij did not exceed the budget, it follows there exists an item j * with price (highest other bid) p j * such that b ij * ≤ p j * < b ij * of which i was not winning everything when bidding b i . Now consider gradually increasing b ij * towards b ij * (or increasing the fraction of j * that i accepts). If the b ij did not already exhaust the budget, then the moment that i starts winning some of j * (at a price below her valuation), we have found a better response and hence the required contradiction. If the b ij did already exhaust the budget, then once i starts winning some of j * , we can pay for this by reducing the amount spent on some item j * * with p ij * * = α max 
e., the bang-per-buck is actually higher on j * . So shifting spending to j * is utility-improving, giving us the required contradiction. To see why we need an assumption on how to break ties, consider the situation from the perspective of bidder 1, where v 11 = 1, v 12 = 1/2, and B 1 = 1/2. Bidder 2 has valuations v 21 = 1/2, v 22 = 1/8 and unlimited budget. This is shown on the left side of Figure 2 . If bidder 1 wins (some of) item 1 with a multiplicative paced bid, this implies α 1 ≥ 1/2, hence α 1 v 12 ≥ 1/4 > 1/8 so that she wins item 2 as well. But if she does not control what fraction of the items she wins, a second price auction may charge her as much as 1/2 + 1/8 > B 1 , resulting in a −∞ utility. So to be safe she should set α i < 1/2 and lose item 1, resulting in a utility of at most 1/2 − 1/8 = 3/8. If multiplicative pacing were not used, then she could guarantee utility 1/2 by bidding 1 on item 1 and 0 on item 2, thereby staying in budget. Controlling the fraction she wins of each item, for α 1 = 1/2, she can choose to win 3/4 of item 1 and all of item 2, for a combined valuation of 3/4 + 1/2 = 5/4 and a combined payment of 3/8 + 1/8 = 1/2 = B 1 . This results in a utility of 3/4, which is the best possible.
To support the previous argument, it should be noted that if we split each item into many pieces, a bidder can in fact control the fractions that she wins when tied by slightly modifying the bids on these pieces. In the context of an auction market with many similar impressions (where we think of an "item" as representing a particular type of impression), this is reasonable; moreover in practice this is likely to happen automatically as the pacing multiplier is dynamically adjusted over time (though in this paper we do not model such dynamics). We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 1.
The implication of the previous result is that the set of best responses always intersects with the multiplicatively paced bid vectors. This, however, does not mean that if we sequentially set each bidder's bids to a best-responding multiplicatively paced bid vector, we end up with an equilibrium, because the optimal multiplier depends on the multipliers chosen by others. The following example illustrates that iterating best responses can cycle. Example 1. Consider the set of valuations shown in Table 1 and budgets 60, 1300 and ∞, for bidders 1 to 3, respectively. All bidders start with a multiplier of 1. We will show that, by iterating best responses, all multipliers return to 1 after 5 iterations. Those iterations are illustrated in Figure 3 and stepped through below.
• Initially, bidder 1 wins auctions 1 and 5 and pays 60; bidder 2 wins auctions 2, 3, 4, and 6 and pays 1928. Bidder 2 exceeds its budget of 1300 at these multipliers-it exhausts its budget from auction 2 alone, in which it pays 1300, and it also wins three other auctions. Bidder 2's best response is to lower its multiplier so that it wins only auction 2. To do so, bidder 2 sets its multiplier somewhere on the interval (1300/6503, 5/25) ≈ (0.1999, 0.2): any lower, and its bid for auction 2 drops below bidder 1's bid of 1300, in which case bidder 2 wins nothing; any higher, and its bid for auction 6 exceeds bidder 3's bid of 5, in which case bidder 2 exceeds its budget.
• After bidder 2 lowers its multiplier, bidder 1 wins more auctions: In addition to what it was winning previously, bidder 1 also wins auction 3 at a price equal to bidder 2's paced bid of at least 300.6(1300/6503) ≈ 60.09. Bidder 1 exhausts its budget of 60 from auction 3 alone. Bidder 1 must set its multiplier low enough to not win auction 3, but such a multiplier is so low that it results in bidder 1 losing all other auctions. Bidder 1's best response is to tie on auction 3, where bidder 2's paced bid is at most 300.6(5/25). To do so, bidder 1 sets its multiplier to at most 300.6(5/25)/123 ≈ 0.488.
• After bidder 1 lowers its multiplier, bidder 2 goes from losing to tying on auction 3, causing bidder 2 to pay more than it was previously for that auction, but it also pays much less for auction 2: Instead of paying 1300 for auction 2 as it was previously, it pays around 1300(0.488) = 634.4. Because bidder 2 is paying so much less for auction 2, it can raise its multiplier to 1, causing it to win auctions 3, 4, and 6 and to pay less than its budget.
• After bidder 2 raises its multiplier to 1, bidder 1 no longer wins auction 3. It can raise its multiplier to 1 and still not exhaust its budget. This brings us back to the first iteration, where all multipliers were set to 1.
Although applying iterated best responses to pacing multipliers can cycle, the example above still admits multipliers that constitute an equilibrium with the corresponding fractional allocation. But more generally, does such an equilibrium exist for all instances? Computationally, how hard is it to find one? Before we can answer these questions, we need to define the notion of equilibrium formally. Intuitively, pacing equilibria consist of pacing multipliers α i for each bidder i and fractional allocations f ij for each bidder-good pair such that all bidders are either spending their entire budget, or using a pacing multiplier of 1. Definition 1. A pacing equilibrium is defined by values of pacing multipliers α i ∈ [0, 1] for each bidder, fractions f ij indicating how much of each item j each bidder i receives, and spendings s ij that indicate how much each bidder spends on each item (thus the unit price that i pays for j is p ij = s ij /f ij ), such that:
• For all j, i f ij ≤ 1 (with equality if there is at least one i with v ij > 0); also, for all i and j, f ij > 0 implies that i's bid α i v ij was (possibly tied for) the highest on j.
• If f ij > 0, then p ij is the highest bid α i v i j other than i's bid.
• For all i, j s ij ≤ B i . In addition, if the inequality is strict, then α i = 1.
Our definition of pacing equilibrium does not explicitly require that bidders are best responding. We show that this property nonetheless follows from our definition:
Proposition 2. For any pacing equilibrium {α i , f ij } i∈N,j∈M , the pacing multiplier α i is a best response for each bidder i ∈ N .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary bidder i ∈ N . We will consider two cases. When α i = 1, bids equal values for all items. By the properties of the second-price auction, this bidder cannot gain additional utility by raising or lowering their bid. When α i < 1, the bidder is guaranteed to be spending their entire budget by the definition of a pacing equilibrium. Raising α i may cause overspending if additional items are won, in which case bidder i's utility will be −∞. Conversely, if bidder i lowers α i , the only thing that can happen is winning fewer items. Since the bidder is already bidding less than the true valuation, this can only reduce the utility.
Existence results
A pacing equilibrium is not exactly a Nash equilibrium, because it requires not only a profile of strategies (where the α i would correspond to strategies) but also one of allocations. Even ignoring this issue, there are discontinuities involved that might be suspected to get in the way of equilibrium existence: upon exceeding another bid there is a jump in one's utility, and again for exceeding one's budget. On top of that, in the definition of pacing equilibrium, we require bidders to break certain indifferences towards higher bids: a bidder i who at α i = 1 wins nothing is not allowed to use a lower value of α i in the definition. For these reasons, we next define a smoothed version of the pacing game, which takes care of all these issues. In the smoothed version, the allocation varies continuously and is determined as a function of the α i only, the penalty for exceeding one's budget varies continuously, and strict incentive is given to bid higher. We show we can apply a pure Nash equilibrium existence result to such games. We then show that if we take a sequence of such games that converges to a (non-smoothed) pacing game, then this sequence of pure Nash equilibria converges to a pacing equilibrium.
Definition 2. For > 0 and H > 0, an ( , H)-smoothed pacing game is a game where the set of pure strategies for each bidder i is the set of pacing multipliers α i ∈ [0, 1]. For a fixed choice of pacing multipliers, the original pacing auction market is modified as follows in order to compute allocations and payments:
• Reserve bid: there is an artificial bid of 2 on all items (treated as one of the bidders in the below).
• Allocation and pricing rule: For every item j, consider the highest bid
j − } be the set of bidders close to the maximum bid for j. Then i ∈ S j wins the following fraction of item j:
, and pays s ij = f ij p ij for this, where p ij is the highest bid on j among bidders other than i, minus (which is necessarily at most b * j − ). For the other bidders, f ij = s ij = 0.
• Additional artificial spend (to encourage higher bids from those who have not spent their budgets): Each bidder will additionally receive a quantity α i of an artificial good (with unlimited supply) worth 2 per unit to her, and pay α i for this. This results in a profit of α i if the budget is not exceeded by this payment.
• Utility: The utility of bidder i is
The smoothing of allocations and payments allows us to apply existence theorems about purestrategy Nash equilibria.
Theorem 1. Consider a smoothed pacing game in which a strategy for bidder i consists of choosing α i ∈ [0, 1]. Also, let M be any upper bound on the sum of a bidder's valuations in the game, including those for the artificial good. For H > M/ , the game admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We will apply a theorem by Debreu (1952) , Glicksberg (1952), and Fan (1952) (see also Ozdaglar (2010, p. 20) ) that guarantees existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium under the following conditions (which we immediately show apply to our game):
• Compact and convex strategy space. This holds because α i ∈ [0, 1].
• Continuity of utility in all strategies. This holds for the following reasons: f ij and s ij are continuous in all the α i (in particular, note that bidders i who are just barely in S j with
. And utility is continuous in these quantities (in particular, note that the expressions for bidders who exceed and do not exceed the budget coincide at 2α i + j f ij v ij when the budget is spent exactly).
• Quasiconcavity of utility in the bidder's own strategy. This means we must show that u i (α i , α −i ) is quasiconcave in α i . This is the case if there exists a number t such that for α i < t, u i is nondecreasing in α i , and for α i > t, u i is nonincreasing in α i . Bidder i's total spend α i + j s ij is increasing and continuous in α i . Holding α −i fixed, let t be the value of α i such that α i + j s ij = B i (if no such value exists we may set t = 1). Then, for α i < t, u i is increasing in α i , because increasing α i results in winning more items (including more of the artificial good) at prices below i's valuation (α i does not affect p ij , and if i is winning part of j then v ij ≥ αv ij ≥ b * j − ≥ p ij ). For α i > t, i's total spend (including on the artificial good) is increasing in α i , and any additional spend will exceed i's budget, decreasing the utility term H(B − α i − j s ij ) at rate H. Because each item (including the artificial good) costs at least 2 − = , the value gained from items bought increases at a rate of at most M/ , which by assumption is smaller. Hence, utility is decreasing in α i when α i > t.
Using the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in smoothed pacing games, we can show that a limit point of decreasingly smoothed games constitutes a pacing equilibrium in the original pacing game.
Theorem 2. Any (non-smoothed) pacing game admits a pacing equilibrium.
Proof. For a given pacing game, consider a sequence of smoothed versions of it, defined by ( l , H l ), satisfying H l > M/ l , lim l→∞ l = 0, and lim l→∞ H l = ∞. Consider an associated sequence of equilibria of these games (guaranteed to exist by Theorem 1) defined by {α l i , f l ij , p l ij , s l ij }. This sequence must have a subsequence with a limit point {α * i , f * ij , p * ij , s * ij } by virtue of the fact that these numbers lie in a compact space (the values provide an upper bound on the payments); replace the sequence by this subsequence. We will show that this limit point is an equilibrium of the original pacing game, via the following claims.
• The allocation is feasible. Since for each l and j, i f l ij ≤ 1, we must have i f * ij ≤ 1. Moreover, suppose that there exists i with v ij > 0. Because B i > 0, there is some positive value of α i that guarantees i stays below budget; hence i will bid at least α i v ij for every l. Thus, for sufficiently large l, l will be sufficiently small that the reserve bidder wins none of j, and i f l i j = 1. Hence i f * i j = 1 in this case.
in fact is at least tied for the highest bid on j.
• The payments are right. p * ij = lim l→∞ p l ij . The latter is the highest other bid minus l . The highest other bid converges to the highest other bid at the limit point (note the reserve bid goes to 0), and l goes to 0. Moreover,
• No bidder exceeds her budget. We must show that for each bidder i, j s * ij ≤ B i . Suppose not. Then there exists δ > 0 such that for any L, we can find l > L with j s l ij ≥ B i + δ. But if we let L be such that for l > L, we have H l > M/δ, then the bidder's utility for the equilibrium of the resulting game l is at most M − δH l < M − M = 0. (Spending on the artificial good only makes things worse.) But the bidder can guarantee herself utility 0 by setting α l i = 0, contradicting the fact that we have an equilibrium. Hence no bidder exceeds her budget.
• A bidder with α * i < 1 spends her entire budget. Suppose not, i.e., there is such a bidder with j s * ij < B i . Then we can find L such that for l > L, both α l i l + j s l ij < B i (because l goes to 0) and α l i < 1. But as we pointed out earlier, for such a bidder utility is strictly increasing in α l i (the strictness is due to the artificial good). Thus this bidder is not best-responding, contradicting the fact that we have an equilibrium. Hence a bidder with α * i < 1 spends her entire budget.
Sensitivity and Multiplicity of Equilibria
Now that we know that at least one pacing equilibrium exists, we may ask the following questions. First, can pacing equilibria be very sensitive to input parameters? Second, can a pacing game admit multiple pacing equilibria, and if so, can they differ significantly from each other? We will show that the answer is "yes" in each case. Both questions require us to have some measure of how different one equilibrium is from another, and the questions are interesting only if the measure is something that we care about. Hence, we study these questions in terms of objectives that we might pursue. We define the following two natural objectives.
Definition 3. Consider a feasible solution to a pacing game. We define revenue as the sum of all the spendings, i.e., ij s ij .
Definition 4. Consider a feasible solution to a pacing game. We define social welfare as the sum of winning valuations, i.e., ij f ij v ij .
Definition 5. Consider a feasible solution to a pacing game. We define paced welfare as the sum of winning paced valuations, i.e., ij f ij α i v ij .
It may not be obvious why paced welfare is the correct measure to use. The following two properties characterize it.
Definition 6. A welfare measure coincides with social welfare when budgets are large if, whenever α i = 1 for all bidders i, it evaluates to ij f ij v ij .
The second property relies on the fact that, once a bidder's budget becomes too small, then that bidder's valuations are relevant only insofar as they indicate the relative values of the items. But they no longer make sense as an absolute dollar figure: if one were to double all the valuations, without touching the budget, nothing would change in the auctions. The next observation makes this precise.
Observation 1. Given a pacing equilibrium where for some i, α i < 1, if we modify all of i's valuations to v ij = β i v ij where β i ≥ α i , then we can retain the original pacing equilibrium by setting α i = α i /β i . Call this an irrelevant shift in valuations.
This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 7. A welfare measure is robust to irrelevant shifts in valuations if it produces the same value after an irrelevant shift in valuations.
Proposition 3. Paced welfare is the unique welfare measure that coincides with social welfare when budgets are large and is robust to irrelevant shifts in valuations.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that paced welfare satisfies the conditions. To show that it does so uniquely, consider any welfare measure satisfying the two conditions and any feasible solution of a pacing game. We prove that the welfare measure must coincide with paced welfare, by induction on the number of agents i with α i < 1. If there are 0 such agents, then this follows from the fact that the measure coincides with social welfare in this case. Suppose we have shown it to be true with k such agents; we will show it with k + 1. Choose an arbitrary agent i with α i < 1. Modify the agent's valuations to v ij = α i v ij , and let α i = α i /α i = 1. This is an irrelevant shift in valuations, so the modification affects neither paced welfare nor the welfare measure under consideration. But by the induction assumption, the two must coincide after the shift. So they must have coincided before the shift as well.
We now show that both objectives can be sensitive to budgets.
Example 2 (Arbitrarily large paced welfare loss from small changes in budgets). Bidder 1 has valuation v 11 = 100 and budget B 1 = 1.01. Bidder 2 has valuation v 21 = 1 and budget B 2 = ∞. Then we have a pacing equilibrium with α 1 = α 2 = 1 where 1 wins all of item 1 for a paced welfare of 100. Moreover this is the unique pacing equilibrium because neither bidder can spend her whole budget. Now, reduce B 1 to 0.99. We still must have α 2 = 1. Hence, we must have α 1 ≤ 0.01, because otherwise 1 will exceed her budget on item 1. As a result, paced welfare is at most 1.
Example 3 (Arbitrarily large revenue loss from small changes in budgets). Bidder 1 has valuations v 11 = 100 and v 12 = 100, and budget B 1 = 1.01. Bidder 2 has valuations v 21 = 1 and v 22 = 101, and budget B 2 = ∞. Then we have a pacing equilibrium with α 1 = α 2 = 1 where 1 wins all of item 1 at price 1 and 2 wins all of item 2 at price 100, for a revenue of 101. Moreover this is the unique pacing equilibrium: bidder 2 cannot possibly spend his whole budget and hence must have α 2 = 1, and given this, bidder 1 cannot win any of item 2 and will spend less than her whole budget on item 1, so that α 1 = 1 as well. Now, reduce B 1 to 0.99. We still must have α 2 = 1. Hence, we must have α 1 ≤ 0.01, because otherwise 1 will exceed her budget on item 1. As a result, revenue from each item is at most 1, for a total revenue of at most 2.
We next provide three examples that show that within the same pacing game, there can be multiple pacing equilibria that are very different from each other in terms of welfare, paced welfare, or revenue. 
99, resulting in a total paced welfare of 1 + 100 + 100 + 99 = 300.
Example 6 (Arbitrarily large revenue differences across equilibria). Let v 11 = v 22 = 100, v 12 = v 21 = 1, v 13 = v 23 = 99, and v 14 = v 34 = 100. Let all other valuations be 0. Moreover, let bidders 1 and 2 have budget 1 each, and let bidder 3 have budget 100. One pacing equilibrium is α 1 = 1, α 2 = 0.01, α 3 = 1, where bidder 1 wins item 1 for 0.01 and item 3 for 0.99, bidder 2 wins item 2 for 1, and bidder 3 wins item 4 for 100, resulting in a total revenue of 102. Another pacing equilibrium is α 1 = 0.01, α 2 = 1, α 3 = 1, where bidder 1 wins item 1 for 1, bidder 2 wins item 2 for 0.01 and item 3 for 0.99, and bidder 3 wins item 4 for 1, resulting in a total revenue of 3.
These last three results suggest that it may be worthwhile to consider equilibrium selection procedures. While in this paper we do not explicitly consider settings where pacing multipliers are dynamically adjusted over time, the point extends to such settings, and it may be worthwhile either to design the dynamics carefully or to carefully initialize the pacing multipliers, in order to reach a desirable equilibrium. Specifically, for the latter approach, we could approximate the dynamic setting with a pacing game (of the static variety discussed in this paper), compute an optimal equilibrium, initialize the pacing multipliers accordingly in the dynamic setting, and hope that the dynamics stay close to a desirable equilibrium as a result. We next study how to compute optimal equilibria, first showing that this is NP-hard (Section 6) and then giving a MIP formulation (Section 7).
It is important to highlight that while we have shown that examples exist where equilibria have very different objective values, it does not mean that this is necessarily the case in realistic instances. We will return to this point in Section 8 where we investigate this question on simulated instances, in which we solve for equilibria using the MIP formulation.
Hardness
Now that we know that a pacing equilibrium must always exist, we investigate the hardness of computing one. In fact, in this paper, we do not resolve the question of how hard it is to just identify (any) one equilibrium. Instead, we focus on finding equilibria that optimize some objective. We show that it is NP-complete to find equilibria maximizing the objectives of social welfare, paced welfare, or total revenue.
The following auction-market instance will be useful as a gadget in hardness reductions. In particular, it can be used to model binary decisions.
Example 7. Given K 1 , α > 0, δ ≥ 0 (with α + δ < 1), and small , let
, and v 13 = v 24 = K 1 /α + . Both bidders have budget K 1 . One pacing equilibrium is α 1 = 1, α 2 = α. This results in bidder 1 winning items 1, 2, and 3, for a total price of 2αK 2 + αK 1 = (1 − α − δ)K 1 + αK 1 = (1 − δ)K 1 , and bidder 2 winning item 4 for a total price of K 1 . By symmetry, there is another equilibrium with α 1 = α, α 2 = 1, in which bidder 2 retains δK 1 of his budget.
We next show that for this instance, when α and δ are small, there are no pacing equilibria where both bidders have even a moderately high multiplier. Hence, if for some reason we are interested in pacing equilibria with high multipliers, we can choose to make either α 1 or α 2 as high as possible, but attempting to make both of them even somewhat high at the same time is doomed to failure.
Proposition 4. In Example 7, when α + δ < 1/3, there is no pacing equilibrium where α 1 ≥ 3α and α 2 ≥ 3α.
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that such an equilibrium exists. Then the total price of the first two items is at least 6αK 2 = 3(1 − α − δ)K 1 > 2K 1 (here the inequality follows from the inequality assumed in the proposition), which is the combined budget of the two bidders, resulting in the desired contradiction.
Using Example 7 as a gadget to model binary variables, we show our hardness results by reduction from SATISFIABILITY. A SATISFIABILITY instance consists of a tuple (V, C). Here, V is a set of Boolean variables, and C is a set of clauses of the form (l 1 ∨ l 2 ∨ l 3 ) where each l i represents a literal requiring some variable to be true or false.
We start by showing that revenue maximization is a computationally hard problem. The decision problem is as follows.
Definition 8 (MAX-REVENUE-PACING). We are given items, bidders, bidders' valuations for items, bidders' budgets, and a number T . We are asked whether there exists a pacing equilibrium that achieves revenue at least T .
Theorem 3. MAX-REVENUE-PACING is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce an arbitrary SATISFIABILITY instance to the following MAX-REVENUE instance. We set T equal to the number of clauses, plus 4 times the number of variables, in the SATISFIABILITY instance. For every variable x j , we create a copy of Example 7, consisting of bidders 1 x j , 2 x j and items 1 x j , 2 x j , 3 x j , 4 x j , with bids as specified in the example, using K 1 = 4, α = 1/4, δ = 0, and (hence) K 2 = 6. Each of these items will only be bid on by the bidders corresponding to its own variable (the other bidders have valuation 0 for them). However, the bidders will bid on other items as well, namely items corresponding to the clauses. Specifically, we associate bidder 1 x j with the literal +x j , and bidder 2 x j with the literal −x j . A bidder values a clause item at 1 if its literal occurs in that clause, and at 0 otherwise. Finally, we add a single bidder with unlimited budget that values every clause item at 2. Hence, this bidder will necessarily win all the clause items, at price at most 1 each. Suppose a satisfying assignment exists. If x j is set to true, set α 1 x j = 1 and α 2 x j = α; otherwise, set α 1 x j = α and α 2 x j = 1. This depletes the budgets of the bidders corresponding to variables, resulting in a revenue of 4 times the number of variables. Moreover, for every clause item, the unlimited-budget bidder faces one of the variable bidders with a multiplier of 1, since we had a satisfying assignment. Hence this bidder pays an amount equal to the number of clauses. Hence the MAX-REVENUE-PACING instance has a solution.
Conversely, suppose the MAX-REVENUE-PACING instance has a solution. Then, the unlimited-budget bidder must pay at least an amount equal to the number of clauses. Because she pays at most 1 on each clause item, it follows that she must pay exactly 1 on each clause item. Hence, at least one of the bidders corresponding to positive literals in each clause must have a multiplier 1. But since, by Proposition 4, at most one of the two bidders corresponding to a variable can have a multiplier of 1, it follows that these bidders correspond to a satisfying assignment.
An auctioneer may be more interested in social welfare than revenue. Unfortunately, social welfare maximization also turns out to be a computationally hard problem. The decision problem is as follows.
Definition 9 (MAX-WELFARE-PACING).
We are given items, bidders, bidders' valuations for items, bidders' budgets, and a number T . We are asked whether there exists a pacing equilibrium that achieves social welfare at least T .
Definition 10 (MAX-PACED-WELFARE-PACING).
We are given items, bidders, bidders' valuations for items, bidders' budgets, and a number T . We are asked whether there exists a pacing equilibrium that achieves paced social welfare at least T .
Theorem 4. MAX-WELFARE-PACING and MAX-PACED-WELFARE-PACING are NPcomplete.
Proof. We reduce an arbitrary SATISFIABILITY instance to the following MAX-WELFARE instance. We set up bidders corresponding to variables as in the MAX-REVENUE proof. We set α = δ = 1 8 , K 1 = 1, and thus K 2 = 3. We let V, C be the sets of variables and clauses in the SATISFIABILITY instance, respectively. We set T equal to
For clauses, a bidder values a clause at value
|C| if its literal occurs in that clause, and at 0 otherwise. Finally, we add a single bidder with unlimited budget that values every clause item at
Suppose a satisfying assignment exists. Perform the assignment as in the MAX-REVENUE setting. That gives a social welfare of |V |(2K 2 + ( K 1 α + )) from the variable items. Furthermore, for each clause, at least one satisfied-literal bidder has its pacing multiplier set to 1, thus winning the clause item, yielding utility δK 1 |C| . Summing over the clauses gives the desired social welfare. Each bidder can at most win all the clauses, and thus their spend is bounded by (1 − δ)K 1 + δK 1 , satisfying their budget constraint.
Conversely, suppose the MAX-WELFARE-PACING instance has a solution. Then each clause item must be allocated to a satisfied-literal bidder. But, in order to beat the unlimitedbudget bidder, the satisfied-literal bidder must have a pacing multiplier of at least 1 2 . By Proposition 4, this means that the bidder corresponding to the opposite literal must have a multiplier less than or equal to 3 8 . Therefore, the bidders with pacing multipliers of at least 1 2 correspond to a satisfying assignment.
We can perform almost the same reduction for MAX-PACED-WELFARE-PACING. We construct the same set of bidders and valuations. We set T equal to
If a satisfying assignment exists, we can set the same pacing assignment as before. The only difference from the previous construction is that the paced welfare from the variable items is now |V |(2K 2 + (K 1 + 8 )). Combined with the clause item assignment, this gives exactly the desired paced welfare. The converse case becomes simpler. For any MAX-PACED-WELFARE-PACING solution, it must be the case that each variable has at least one bidder with a pacing multiplier of 1. To obtain the remaining paced welfare of δK 1 , these bidders with pacing multiplier 1 must correspond to a satisfying assignment.
One immediate implication of these hardness results is that, when the pacing multipliers result from dynamic adjustment, we cannot expect simple dynamics to always converge to an optimal equilibrium. Hence, it may be worthwhile to attempt to intelligently guide the dynamics in order to improve the chances of them ending up at a desirable equilibrium.
Computing pacing equilibria
Although we have proven that computing equilibria is hard, it is still useful to be able to compute them; for example to study their properties (e.g., by finding multiple equilibria maximizing different objectives; see Sections 5 and 8). We provide an algorithm that can find equilibria relying on a MIP formulation. The constraints of the problem are equivalent to the equilibrium conditions, implying that a solution is feasible iff it satisfies the conditions given in Definition 1. By optimizing with respect to various objectives, we can refine the solution procedure and find different equilibria.
To define the problem, it will be convenient to letv j = max i∈N v i,j be the maximum value for good j for any bidder. We will need the following variables:
• h j ∈ R + : The highest bid for good j.
• x ij ∈ {0, 1} : 1 if bidder i may win any part of good j. (∀i ∈ N, j ∈ M )
• y i ∈ {0, 1} : 1 if bidder i spends its full budget. (∀i ∈ N )
• w ij ∈ {0, 1} : 1 if bidder i is the winner of good j. (∀i ∈ N, j ∈ M )
• r ij ∈ {0, 1} : 1 if bidder i is the second price for good j. (∀i ∈ N, j ∈ M ) Most variables are self-explanatory, as they denote the same as in the pacing-game definition. Variables w ij , and r ij represent a bidder that is considered the winner and a bidder that is considered the runner up because the bid was a second price, respectively, for each item j. The winner does not participate in lower-bounding the price (constraint (9)), and the runner up upper bounds the price (constraint (10)). In both cases, ties are broken arbitrarily but only one bidder can be chosen.
Although there could be multiple winners and runner-ups, selecting exactly one of them is useful to encode the rules of a second price auction.
The equilibria of the pacing game are given exactly by feasible solutions to the following MIP. From a feasible solution, we get pacing multipliers α i for each bidder and spendings s ij for each bidder-good pair. The fraction of good j allocated to bidder i can then be computed as f ij = s ij /p j . (This last computation is not done inside the MIP because it would be nonlinear, but it is an easy computation to do once a solution to the MIP is obtained.)
We now describe the constraints. Constraint (1) ensures that a bidder can spend no more than its budget, while (2) ensures that a bidder's total spend must be at least as large as its budget if that bidder is spending its full budget (this enforces the definition of y i ). Constraint (3) ensures that a bidder must have a pacing multiplier of at least 1 if it does not spend its full budget, (4) ensures that the total spend of a good across bidders must equal the price of that good, and (5) ensures that a bidder's spend on a good is no greater than 0 if it did not win part of that good. Constraint (6) ensures that the highest bid for a good must be at least as high as every paced bid for that good, and (7) ensures that the highest bid for a good must be no greater than the paced bid of every bidder that wins part of that good. Constraint (8) ensures that the designated winner for a good is designated as allowed to win a partial amount of that good, and (9) ensures that the price for a good is at least as high as all paced bids besides the designated winner's paced bid. Constraint (10) ensures that the price for a good is no greater than the runner-up's paced bid, (11) ensures that there is exactly one designated winner, (12) ensures that there is exactly one designated runner-up, and (13) ensures that a bidder cannot be both the designated winner and the designated runner-up of a given auction.
A revenue-maximizing pacing equilibrium can be computed by maximizing j∈M p j in the feasible region defined above, whereas one can use max j∈M h j to maximize the sum of the winning paced bids.
We now show that our feasibility MIP correctly computes a pacing equilibrium.
Proposition 5. A feasible solution to the MIP given by (1)-(13) satisfies the conditions of a pacing equilibrium. Conversely, any pacing equilibrium corresponds to a feasible solution to the MIP.
Proof. Assume that all items j have some bidder i such that v ij > 0. Otherwise, we preprocess the problem by removing all items that no bidders are interested in. First, let α i , f ij ∈ [0, 1], s ij ∈ R + be a pacing equilibrium for a pacing game. Let all MIP variables be set according to their definition as it pertains to the pacing equilibrium. Set x ij = 1 if f ij > 0. If there are multiple bidders with f ij > 0 for item j, set w ij = 1, r i j = 1 for two (and only those two) arbitrary bidders i = i among the winners. We now show that all equations are satisfied. Constraint (1) is implied by the third condition of pacing equilibria. Constraint (2) holds since we set y i = 1 exactly when bidder i spends the whole budget. Constraint (3) is implied by our choice of y i combined with the third condition of pacing equilibria. Constraint (4) is implied by the first condition of pacing equilibria. Constraint (5) is implied by the third condition of pacing equilibria combined with the fact that bidders spend nothing on an item unless they are allocated a non-zero amount. Constraint (6) and (7) are implied by our choice of h j being the highest bid on item j and the fact thatv j upper-bounds v ij . Constraint (8) is implied by our choice for w ij , x ij . Constraint (9) is satisfied because we set p j equal to the second price, and the constraint is disabled for the highest bid due to w ij = 1 and v ij being an upper bound on α i v ij . Constraint (10) is implied by our choice of setting r ij = 1 only if bidder i constitutes the second price, and the fact that the constraint is disabled for all other bidders. Constraints (11), (12), and (13) are implied by our choices for w ij , r ij , respectively. Now assume that we have some satisfying assignment to the MIP. To construct a pacing equilibrium, assign pacing multipliers and spendings according to the values from the MIP, and set f ij = s ij /p j . We now show that each of the three conditions for a pacing equilibrium are satisfied.
Constraint (4) implies i∈N f ij = i∈N s ij /p j = 1. If f ij > 0 then s ij > 0 and by (5) x ij = 1, therefore (6) and (7) imply α i v ij = h j . For all bidders i with f i j = 0, we have α i v i j ≤ α i v ij , otherwise we would violate (6) and thereby contradict our assumption of having a satisfying assignment. This shows that the first condition of a pacing equilibrium is satisfied.
For all i with f ij > 0, we have p ij = p j . We first show that, in a feasible assignment p j must be equal to the second price. p j is both upper and lower-bounded by α i v ij for the bidder i such that r ij = 1. Furthermore, (9) guarantees that p j is at least as high as the second-highest bid. Finally note that if α i v ij is the highest bid h j and r ij = 1, then there must exist at least one other bidder such that α i v i j = h j because (13) ensures that w i j = 1 for some i , and (7)- (8) then imply that bidder i must satisfy α i v i j = h j . This shows that p j is the second price. Now it remains to note that all bidders i with f ij > 0 pay p j , which is exactly the highest bid other than their own for r ij = 0. When r ij = 1, we established that w i j = 1 for some other bidder, and thus i and i must be tied for first price, and bidder i is thus still paying the highest bid other than their own. This shows that the second condition of a pacing equilibrium is satisfied.
Constraint (1) ensures that all budgets are satisfied. Constraints (2) and (3) ensure that if budgets are not fully spent then y i = 0, and α i is then forced to be 1. This shows that the third condition of a pacing equilibrium is satisfied.
If we are not concerned with a particular objective, but instead just want to compute any one pacing equilibrium, we can use the following two approaches: The first is to simply run the original MIP as a feasibility problem with no objective. The second is to relax the complementarity condition (3). We introduce a variable z i for each bidder i that represents whether that bidder satisfies (3). We replace (3) by α i ≥ 1 − y i − z i (∀i ∈ N ). If z i = 1, then this constraint is no longer active since α i ≥ 0 ≥ −y i is implied by the nonnegativity of α i and y i . If z 0 = 0 then this constraint is our standard complementarity condition on α i and y i . We can then solve this relaxed MIP with the objective i∈N z i . A solution where the objective is zero corresponds to a feasible solution to the original MIP.
Computational Experiments
In this section we present simulation experiments using the MIPs presented in the previous section. We used several MIPs: the pure feasibility MIP defined by (1)-(13) (feasibility), the MIP with the relaxed version of (3) (relaxed feasibility), and the feasibility MIP with objectives that minimize or maximize revenue or paced welfare (min revenue, max revenue, min paced welfare, max paced welfare, respectively). All computations were done with a time limit of 5 minutes using Xpress Optimization Suite 8.0 FICO (2016) on a server with 24 single-core Intel Haswell CPUs running at 2.5GHz and 60GB of RAM. The relatively short timeout allowed us to run simulations for an extensive set of generated instances. Solutions were programmatically checked to satisfy the pacing equilibrium conditions. We mainly report the percentage of solutions that finish within the allocated time limit, and the gap between the best and worst equilibrium with respect to each of the considered objectives. Since (unpaced) social welfare cannot easily be expressed as a linear expression, it is not straightforward to optimize that objective with the MIP. Hence, when we state differences in social welfare below, we refer to the difference between the maximum and minimum social welfare observed among the solutions we computed (all the MIPs mentioned above). Hence, the reported gaps in social welfare are a lower bound on the maximal achievable gap.
In our first set of experiments we consider randomly generated complete market instances, where every bidder is interested in every good. Specifically, we consider sets of 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 bidders, and 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 14 goods. For each combination, we generated 5 pacing instances, for a total of 175 instances. For each bidder i, the valuation for each good is drawn uniformly iid from [0, 1], and her budget is drawn uniformly from [0, J v ij /|N |]. The runtime results are shown in red in Figure 4 . We find that our relaxed feasibility MIP solves the most instances (105 out of 175). Most solved instances admit either a unique equilibrium or have indistinguishable equilibria in terms of social welfare, paced social welfare, and revenue. There is a gap in social welfare only in seven instances, and it is always below 5.6%. For paced welfare, 81 instances solved for both min and max paced welfare. Only seven of those have a gap, five of them in the range 9-40%, and the other two below 5%. Note that for the instances with high paced welfare differences, the social welfare difference is below 2.3%. For revenue, 71 instances solved for both min and max revenue. Only two of those have a revenue gap (46% and 18%).
In our second set of experiments, we consider a setting where bidders are only interested in items with some fixed probability. Instances were generated using the same procedure as in the first experiments, except that instead of using a complete bipartite graph, for each auction, we randomly chose a subset of interested bidders uniformly from the power set of {1, . . . , |N |}. After sampling interested bidders for all auctions, if some bidder ended up interested in zero auctions, we uniformly sample a single auction for that bidder to be interested in. The green color in Figure 4 shows runtime characteristics of this set of experiments. In this setting we find that our feasibility MIP solves the most instances, solving 156 out of 175 instances. The pacing equilibrium characteristics are similar to those with a complete bipartite graph: only eight instances have two or more equilibria that are distinguishable in terms of social welfare, paced social welfare, or revenue. The social welfare differs in the eight instances, but never by more than 2.7%. For paced welfare 140 instances were solved for both min and max paced welfare. Paced welfare differs in eight instances, with five instances having significant differences of 9 − 18%, and the rest having minor differences of 3% or less. For the instances with high paced welfare differences, the social welfare difference is still 2.7% or less. For revenue 120 instances were solved for min and max revenue. Four instances have revenue differences, two of them with large differences of 44% and 11%, and two with small differences of 0.16% and 3%.
In our third set of experiments, we generated instances that have correlation between valuations. Each instance was generated independently as follows: We sample interested bidders uniformly at random for each auction in the same way as in the previous paragraph. For each auction a in an instance, we sample a mean auction valuation µ a uniformly in [0, 1] . Finally, to get a valuation for a given bidder-auction pair, we sample a valuation from a Gaussian distribution truncated to [0, 1] with mean µ a and standard deviation σ. We considered 12 different standard deviations: 3. We used the same choices of bidders, auctions, and instances per configuration choice as previously. This lead to a total of 2100 instances. The blue color in Figure 4 shows runtimes corresponding to these instances. Out of the 2100 instances, 95 instances have social welfare gaps (about 5%). Ten of those gaps are in the range 1%-3%, while the rest are below 1%. For paced social welfare, out of the 1483 instances solved for both objectives, 89 have a gap in paced social welfare. Less than 3% of those have a gap greater than 5%. For revenue, out of the 1436 instances solved for both objectives, less than 0.3% have a gap greater than 1%. Interestingly, across all three sets of experiments, the objectives that minimize either revenue or paced social welfare solve far fewer instances than the other objectives. While we found that most instances do not have large differences in revenue, social welfare, or paced social welfare, we could not solve all instances for the different sets of experiments within the time limit. The possibility exists that the instances with large differences are exactly those that we are not solving. To test this, we looked at the runtimes of instances with large differences. We found that these tended to be instances that are solved quickly. None of the instances with nonzero gaps took more than ten seconds to solve, and most less than one minute (recall that the time limit was five minutes). While this is not a conclusive proof, it suggests that, if anything, longer runtimes are because of sparseness of equilibria, and not because of multiplicity.
We now move beyond the MIPs to consider computational experiments that use best-response (BR) dynamics. BR dynamics can be thought of as a repeated auction market where each bidder has some budget to spend every day and wishes to set its pacing multiplier appropriately. At the end of each day, bidders observe the outcome for the day and best respond to the strategy of the other players. Our goal in these experiments was to see whether warm-starting BR dynamics with the MIP output can improve convergence of BR dynamics and lead it to outcomes with higher welfare than it would otherwise achieve.
We consider two BR algorithms that differ in how the best response is computed. If there is more than one BR pacing multiplier, we break ties towards the highest pacing multiplier (BR high), or towards the lowest (BR low ). Both algorithms always start from the same random initialization of pacing multipliers. In addition, we consider BR high starting from the MIP solutions and refer to it as Init MIP. When needed, we replace MIP in the name by a specific MIP objective. For the BR setting, we consider random tiebreaking rather than having fractional allocations be part of the bids. Thus, a pacing equilibrium might not be stable if it includes fractional allocations. We evaluated the BR algorithms on a subset of 50 instances taken randomly from those in the computational study. For each iteration, we show the absolute difference in a bidder's multipliers from the previous iteration, averaged across bidders and instances. For MIP initialization we average across solutions from all objectives. We start by looking at BR dynamics convergence and regret. Figure 5 shows that the BR algorithms converge quickly in our computational study. They required less than 10 iterations to reach small oscillations in pacing multipliers. Figure 6 shows the maximum relative regret across all bidders, averaged across instances. The relative regret for a bidder is computed as the ratio of the utility-improvement they could get by best responding, divided by the utility of the best response (i.e., the fraction of utility they are missing out on). For the purposes of computing regret, when a bidder exceeds its budget, we do not set utility to negative infinity; instead we penalize utility by the amount over budget multiplied by the spend-to-budget ratio times paced-welfare-to-budget ratio. We see that both BR high and BR low have somewhat high relative regret, missing out on 7.5%-12% utility. Contrary to this, Init MIP solutions perform well and are able to stay near equilibrium for most instances.
Finally, we look at the improvement in market outcomes from seeding BR dynamics with the MIP output. Figure 7 shows the revenue, welfare, and paced welfare achieved by the different BR dynamics algorithms relative to the MIP. Each point in the plot shows the average performance of a given algorithm relative to the solution maximizing each objective. BR low performs significantly worse than BR high across all three dimensions. For revenue and welfare, they both perform significantly worse than the MIP solutions as well, in spite of the fact that the BR solutions may not even respect budgets. The BR dynamics perform significantly better with MIP initializations than without.
Dynamic Setting All experiments thus far were for a one-shot setting, in which an agent applies a single, static multiplier across all auctions. But in the real world, an agent updates its multiplier over time. Such a dynamic setting was the focus of our next experiments (see also Appendix A for a brief discussion of how our static notion of pacing equilibrium relates to a dynamic setting). We aimed to answer the following questions:
1. How should we interpret a (static) MIP solution in the context of a dynamic setting?
2. Can we improve convergence by warm-starting an adaptive algorithm with a MIP solution? 3. How robust are convergence improvements with respect to noise in the MIP's input?
We first describe details that are common to all subsequent experiments: an adaptive pacing algorithm for the dynamic setting; an algorithm for converting a smaller, one-shot problem instance into a larger, dynamic problem instance; and some additional terms and notation. The adaptive algorithm we used for these experiments is from Balseiro and Gur (2017) . We refer to this algorithm as AdaptivePacing; see Algorithm 1 for details. AdaptivePacing takes as input a pacing instance Γ, a vector of initial pacing multipliers (α init i ) i∈N , a minimum allowable pacing multiplier α min , and a step size . After each auction j ∈ M , each bidder i updates its multiplier based on the difference between the bidder's spend s ij and its target per-auction expenditure ρ i -the average amount to spend per auction to perfectly exhaust the budget. The auction outputs an allocation (f ij ) i∈N and payments s ij ) i∈N .
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Each bidder i updates its multiplier α i,j+1 = max(α min , 1/ max(1, 1/α ij − (ρ i − s ij ))) and remaining budget B i,j+1 = B ij − s ij .
originally. Each auction in the scaled-up instance has valuations that equal those from a good in the original instance. For some experiments-in which we reason about feeding the MIP noisy inputs-these valuations are then perturbed by adding Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard deviation σ. 3 Algorithm 2: ScaleInstance Input: Pacing instance Γ = (N, M, (v ij ) i∈N,j∈M , (B i ) i∈N ); scaling factor C; noise factor σ. Output: Pacing instanceΓ. 1Ñ = {1, . . . , n}; 2M = {1, . . . , Cm}; 3 for i ∈Ñ do 4B i = CB i ; 5 for j ∈M do 6 k j = 1 + (j − 1) mod m; // Rotate over possible good types.
We will use the following notation and terms to describe the dynamic pacing experiments. For a given scaled-up instanceΓ, let k j ∈ M be the good type of auction j; this good type associates the auction in the scaled-up instance with a good in the original instance. LetM j ⊆M be the set of auctions in the scaled-up instance that have good type j (i.e.,M j = {j ∈M : k j = j} for j ∈ M ). For a given run of AdaptivePacing on a scaled-up instance, let f ij be the empirical allocation over good types: the fraction of auctions that bidder i won for good type j ∈ M . That is, let f ij = j ∈M jf ij / i ∈Ñ ,j ∈M jf ij , wheref ij is AdaptivePacing's output allocation (∀i ∈Ñ , j ∈M ). For a given run of AdaptivePacing on a scaled-up instance, let a bidder's regret be the difference between the bidder's maximum possible utility in hindsight (given fixed otheragent bids) and the bidder's realized utility; let the max regret be the maximum such regret across all bidders.
For our first experiment, our aim was to interpret the static MIP solutions in a dynamic environment. We randomly sampled K complete graph problem instances and ran Algorithm 1 with initial multipliers equal to the feasibility MIP's output. For each instance, we computed the absolute difference between the empirical allocation f ij and the MIP's fractional allocation f ij . The parameters we used for this experiment were K = 20, C = 50, α min = 0.05, and = 10 −4 , σ = 0. 4 The results are shown in Figures 8 and 9 . First, to more clearly illustrate the resulting dynamics, Figure 8 shows the per-auction bids for a particular pacing instance, good type, and subset of bidders. In the original version of this instance, the feasibility MIP found a solution in which three bidders won a fractional allocation of the good. When we started AdaptivePacing from the MIP's output multipliers, the induced bids "danced" around the winning price such that the empirical allocation for these bidders nearly matched the MIP output (with allocation values of (0.51, 0.24, 0.25) versus (0.52, 0.24, 0.22) for each respective bidder). More broadly, Figure 9 shows a summary of the absolute differences between the fractional allocations output by the MIP and AdaptivePacing. The mean absolute difference between the fractional allocation of the MIP and AdaptivePacing was 0.015-the fractional MIP allocations were similar to the realized allocations across all instances. Next, we wanted to understand how the MIP might help with an adaptive algorithm's convergence. To answer this question, we measured the average (across instances) max regret when running AdaptivePacing with various parameter values-that is, with various values for initial multipliers (α init i ) i∈N , minimum multiplier α min , and step size . We considered two types of initial multipliers: those that equaled the feasibility MIP's output from the original instance, and those that equaled some constant for all bidders (e.g., each bidder starting with multiplier 0.5). For each set of initial pacing multipliers, we ran a grid search to determine other parameters and α min ; those parameters were set to minimize the average maximum relative regret. The parameters we used for these experiments are K = 6, C = 500, σ = 0, α min ∈ {0.1, 0.05}, and ∈ {0.01, 1, 2}.
Results are shown in Figure 10 . We found that running AdaptivePacing with MIP-based initial multipliers led to lower regret than other choices of initial multipliers. When we used initial multipliers that were based on fixed values, the resulting regret was highly sensitive to choices in the step size; low initial multipliers would often not reach the MIP's equilibrium multipliers by the time the algorithm terminated.
Finally, we considered how robust these convergence results were to noise in the MIP's input. We created (noisy) scaled-up instances by calling ScaleInstance with different values of noise parameter σ. We then ran AdaptivePacing on these scaled-up instances using different initial pacing multipliers. The parameters we used are the same as the previous experiment except σ ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.5}.
Results of this experiment are shown in Figure 11 . We found that warm-starting with the MIP led to lower regret even with random noise added to the problem instance. As expected, performance of the MIP-based solution degraded as more noise was added. But even at the highest levels of noise we considered, the MIP-based solution outperformed the baseline solutions.
Taken together, these experiments for the dynamic setting leave us optimistic about the potential value of the MIP. While the MIP can only be run on smaller instances, it has an interpretation for larger instances in which valuations are drawn jointly across bidders in proportion to valuations from the original instance. Using the MIP to warm-start an adaptive algorithm on these larger instances indeed resulted in better convergence, and these improvements in convergence were robust to noise in the MIP's input. Such robustness is important for two reasons: First, it suggests that the MIP does not need the exact valuation distribution to be useful (which is unlikely to be known in practice); second, it suggests that the valuation distribution could be compressed to create a smaller (approximate) problem instance that could be tractably solved by the MIP. An interesting direction for future work is to explore how to best compress extremely large problem instances-those with many bidders and many more auctions-so that the MIP provides valuable output for warm-starting dynamic pacing problems.
Conclusion
In auction markets, a bidder is not necessarily best off bidding her true valuation in each auction, even if each auction is a Vickrey auction and valuations are additive. This is because doing so may exceed her budget. How, then, should her bids be generated? In this paper, we have formalized and studied multiplicative pacing, which we have proved is optimal in a sense for the bidder (Proposition 1). We have introduced a notion of pacing equilibrium (Definition 1), where the bidders' pacing multipliers (and allocations) are in equilibrium with each other (also justified by Proposition 2). We have proved that an equilibrium exists (Theorem 2), but there may be multiple equilibria with different outcomes. We have showed that finding an optimal equilibrium is NP-hard, for welfare and revenue (Theorems 3 and 4). We have given a MIP formulation for finding optimal pacing equilibria (Section 7) and evaluated them experimentally. The experiments showed that these MIPs are challenging to solve, but they also showed that, in the instances we were able to solve, it is rare that there are multiple equilibria with very different paced welfare or revenue. The experiments also showed that best-response dynamics can converge to a state of small oscillations quickly, but that the generated solutions do not perform as well as the optimal MIP-based solutions. In our adaptive pacing experiments, we showed that simple regret-based dynamics can arrive at allocations that are near our MIP-based solutions, and that these allocations can be improved by seeding with solutions from our MIP, even when the MIP is solving a noisy variant of the problem.
There remain a number of open questions. What is the computational complexity of finding just one pacing equilibrium (not necessarily optimal in any sense)? Can we generalize to auctions with multiple slots? Can we generalize our model to a dynamic setting with uncertainty about future auctions, in which pacing multipliers need to be adjusted over time? In such dynamic settings, given the possibility of multiple equilibria with different objective values and the computational hardness of finding an optimal one, how do we improve our chances of ending up in a good equilibrium? Again, one possibility would be to, using the techniques developed in this paper, compute an optimal equilibrium offline based on an estimate of the distribution of future impressions, and then initialize the multipliers accordingly before proceeding with the dynamics. But, how robust is this to unlikely realizations of the initial impressions (due to which the dynamics may yet take us to a different equilibrium), or to misestimation of the distribution? Also, can we design algorithms for computing optimal equilibria (or even just one equilibrium) that, NP-hardness results notwithstanding, scale better than the MIPs presented in this paper but that have better guarantees than simple heuristics such as simulated dynamics or iterated best response? Can we make further realistic assumptions on the problem class in order to get practical tractability or stronger analytical results? 
A A brief note on dynamics
While there are no dynamics in our model (though we did consider dynamics in the last set of experiments in Section 8), it is nevertheless instructive to consider the definition of pacing equilibrium in the context of dynamics. Specifically, suppose that the items are sold continuously over the period [0, 1] . I.e., at time t ∈ [0, 1] a fraction t of every item will have been sold. Within each infinitesimal slice of time a second-price auction is used for each infinitesimal fraction of an item; if there is a tie for an item then it may be split into arbitrary fractions f ijt among the bidders, summing to 1 if there are positive bids. In an ad auction, this would correspond to the limit case where there are large numbers of all types of impressions, and the distribution of such types does not vary over time. Then, we can consider α i to change dynamically over time (so we get α it ). Specifically, if a bidder i is currently spending at a rate that will overspend her remaining budget over the remaining period [t, 1], we decrease α it ; if it will underspend and α it < 1, then we increase α it . Call this the limit dynamics model. Definition 11. Multipliers α i ∈ [0, 1] and fractions f ij ∈ [0, 1] constitute a stable solution in the limit dynamics model if setting α it = α i and f ijt = f i j (for all i, j, t) satisfies the feasibility conditions for the f ijt and is consistent with the dynamics (i.e., no α it ever needs to be adjusted up or down).
Proposition 6. Multipliers α i and fractions f ij constitute a stable solution in the limit dynamics model if and only if they constitute a pacing equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose they constitute a pacing equilibrium. Then, f ijt is nonzero only if α ijt v ij = α ij v ij is one of the highest bids, and for any j, t, we have i f ijt = i f ij ≤ 1 with equality if there is at least one positive bid. For a bidder with j s ij = B i in the pacing equilibrium, we also have 1 t=0 j s ijt = 1 · j s ij = B i , so the bidder is always exactly on track to spend her budget and the multiplier need not be adjusted. For a bidder with j s ij < B i in the pacing equilibrium we must have α i = 1; we have 1 t=0 j s ijt = 1 · j s ij < B i , so the bidder is always on track to underspend (which is fine because α it = α i = 1). Hence they constitute a stable solution. Conversely, suppose they constitute a stable solution. Then i f ij = i f ij0 ≤ 1 with equality if there is at least one positive bid. We also have Sp ij = s ij /f ij = s ij0 /f ij0 = p ij0 which is the second-highest bid α i0 v ij = α i v ij . For any bidder i, j s ij = 1 t=0 j s ijt ≤ B i . Finally, if α i < 1 then j s ij = 1 t=0 j s ijt = B i (otherwise the multiplier would be adjusted and we would not have α ijt = α ij for all t). Figure 12 shows the relative gap compared to optimal solutions for equilibria maximizing or minimizing the different objectives, measured with respect to each objective, grouped by instance type. Figure 13 shows the relative regret broken down by each algorithm. Each point represents a BR algorithm running on a particular problem instance. We previously observed that Init BIP had lower regret. We also observed that the MIP minimizing paced welfare had the worst performance. This plot shows that the poor performance was actually caused by a single outlier. 
B Additional Experimental Results

